We probe the scope for reacting to house prices in simple and implementable monetary policy rules, using a New Keynesian model with a housing sector and financial frictions on the household side. We show that the social welfare maximizing monetary policy rule features a reaction to house price variations, when the latter are generated by housing demand or financial shocks. The sign and size of the reaction crucially depend on the degree of financial frictions in the economy. When the share of constrained agents is relatively small, the optimal reaction is negative, implying that the central bank must move the policy rate in the opposite direction with respect to house prices. However, when the economy is characterized by a sufficiently high average loan-to-value ratio, then it becomes optimal to counter house price increases by raising the policy rate.
Introduction

1
For a number of years, consensus has been unanimous that no major role should be played by asset prices in monetary policy-making (see, e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (2001) and Mishkin (2007)). The fate of asset prices as a possible ingredient of monetary policy has long seemed set and sealed. The events of the last few years, with repeated crises accompanied by, and often stemming from, violent swings in asset prices, have prompted the economic profession to reconsider whether asset prices should not play a role of sort in monetary policy-making after all. Asset booms and busts had been a systematic feature of the world economy for a number of decades. However, never before the financial crisis that started in 2007 had their contribution to an economic downturn been so sharp, sizeable and extended, as it was between 2008 and 2009.
Those dramatic events have left many wondering whether there might not be good reasons why central banks should actually respond to asset prices in general, and to house prices in particular, given the prominent role played by housing sector developments in precipitating that crisis.
In this paper we investigate whether the effectiveness of monetary policy may be enhanced by the inclusion of house prices among the objectives of the central bank, when the economy is characterized by the presence of financial frictions. In particular, we consider the case of collateral constraints that link the maximum amount that (a fraction of) households can borrow to the value of existing collateral. To this end, we lay out a simple two-sector New Keynesian model with a non-durable consumption sector and a housing sector. Households are divided into patients and impatients according to their discount factor. The impatient agents face a perpetually binding collateral constraints, along the lines of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . The model closely follows Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2009); 2 we abstract from capital accumulation and introduce nominal rigidities in the non-durable consumption sector only. The model is kept as simple as possible, in order to highlight the transmission mechanism and the amplification effect related to the borrowing constraint and to illustrate the main features of the optimal monetary policy.
In the context of this model, we perform a normative analysis and look for optimal monetary policy within the class of simple and operational interest rate rules, according to the definition of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) . Namely, we restrict our attention to policy rules that (i) respond to variables that can be easily observed and (ii) deliver equilibrium determinacy. We are particularly interested in understanding if and how monetary policy must react to house price fluctuations, when the objective is the welfare maximization. 3 Our contribution is twofold.
First, we characterize the optimal simple rule. Simple rules are ranked in terms of welfare levels, which are computed, following a common practice in the literature, using a second-order approximation to the model solution. We also solve the Ramsey problem of a social planner that maximizes the social welfare function subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions and provide the relative welfare losses entailed by the optimal simple rule compared to the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. The social-welfare maximizing rule displays two prominent features.
First, the response to inflation is not as aggressive as it would be in a frictionless model, so that inflation is not fully stabilized under the optimal rule. Such result reflects the existence of a transfer of wealth between borrowers and savers resulting from unexpected variations in the inflation rate. Second, the optimal rule features a negative response to house price inflation,
implying that the policy rate should be lowered in response to an increase in house price inflation.
Such feature mainly reflects, as shown below, a welfare-enhancing choice from the borrower's welfare perspective.
Second, we look deeper into the contribution of financial frictions -as captured by the average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and the share of borrowers in the economy -in shaping the optimal response to house price fluctuations. We show that for a sufficiently small fraction of borrowers, the optimal response is negative, irrespective of the LTV ratio. As the share of borrowers increases, the value of the LTV ratio becomes crucial in determining the sign of of the response, which becomes positive in the neighbourhood of a 90% LTV or more. Such result reflects the fact that the amplification effect generated by the collateral constraint becomes larger as the average LTV ratio increases. The socially optimal rule must take into account not only the potential benefit for the borrower of a relaxation of the collateral constraint (generated via a negative response to house price fluctuations) but also the potential loss for the saver stemming from higher volatility. The latter component tends to prevail as the leverage increases.
Our work relates to a number of previous contributions in the literature.
In terms of modelling structure, Iacoviello and Neri (2010) provide a much richer model estimated on U.S. data, with housing and non-housing goods, household heterogeneity and collateral constraints; the model includes a large number of structural shocks, to capture cyclical dynamics of the main macroeconomic variables. Compared to Iacoviello and Neri (2010) , our model setup is less data-oriented and more stylized. We introduce two exogenous shocks that directly influence housing market dynamics: a housing demand shock and a financial shock (which hits the loan-to-value ratio). Estimated DSGE models with housing and financial frictions (see Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) ) show that housing demand shocks drive most of the cyclical fluctuations in house prices. Ludvigson, Nieuwerburgh, and Favilukis (2013) argue that shocks to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), which can be interpreted as changes in financial regulation, are relevant to generate fluctuations in house prices. Moreover, as illustrated in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) , credit constraints can amplify and propagate exogenous shocks only when such shocks generate fluctuations in the collateral value. This is clearly the case with housing demand and LTV shocks, but not, for instance, with TFP shocks, which leads us to exclude the latter from our experiments. Importantly and different from previous studies (see e.g. Rubio (2011)) we do not consider cost-push shocks either. The latter are known to be a source of policy tradeoff in a standard New Keynesian model. Such tradeoff is however distinct and independent from housing dynamics and financial frictions. In short, we focus only on the sources of disturbance that are peculiar to our setup. 
Impatient households
The impatient agent (denoted with a superscript b) maximizes the following stream of discounted utility:
where X b t is an index of consumption services derived from non-durable consumption C b and the stock of housing goods H b , as follows: 2) and N b C,t , N b H,t denote the impatient agent's hours worked in each sector. A housing preference shock is introduced, ε H t , which affects the marginal rate of substitution between non-durable and housing consumption.
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Impatient agents have limited access to the credit market and face a collateral constraint which, in real terms, reads as follows:
where
Pt is the gross inflation rate, R t is the (gross) short-term nominal interest rate, q t is the relative price of housing goods in terms of non-durable goods and χ ∈ (0, 1) is the down-payment rate, so that (1 − χ) is the loan-to-value ratio. The term ε LT V t denotes an exogenous shock to the loan-to-value ratio, which follows a stationary AR(1) process. Impatient households thus maximize (1) subject to the collateral constraint (3) and the following sequence of real budget constraints:
5 The shock is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process.
where δ is the depreciation rate of the housing good, W 
and
where ε H t is the same housing preference shock introduced above.
7 The saver's real budget constraint reads:
where Π s t are distributed profits (see below). Similarly to the case of the borrowers, it is assumed that state-contingent assets are traded among the savers, in order to hedge against wage income. The corresponding stream of income is denoted A s t . As a result, all savers have identical consumption plans in equilibrium.
Firms
Final producers of the non-residential good operate in perfect competition and aggregate a con- 
. As a result, individual demand for each good is defined as:
Intermediate-goods producers operate in monopolistic competition and produce differentiated products using a linear technology:
where Ω C is a fixed cost. The term L C t (h) aggregates individual labor supply as follows:
Firms set prices on a staggered basisà la Calvo (1983): at any time t, a firm h faces a constant probability θ C of not being able to re-optimize its nominal price. The average duration between price changes is therefore 1 1−θC . Under these assumptions, in a symmetric equilibrium (with p t (h) = p t ∀h) the aggregate price index evolves as follows:
where p t is the price chosen by firm h to maximize its intertemporal profit.
The housing sector is perfectly symmetric to the non-residential goods sectors. The elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods is denoted 
In our baseline calibration we assume that housing prices are perfectly flexible, in line with what often assumed in the literature.
8 The probability that a firm is not able to re-optimize its nominal price is accordingly set equal to zero (θ H =0). We relax this assumption in Section 6, where we also briefly discuss contributions that provide empirical evidence that house prices are not fully flexible and analyse the resulting implications.
Monetary policy
Monetary policy is specified in terms of an interest rate rule as follows:
qt−1 is the housing inflation rate and an upperbar denotes the steady-state value of a given variable. This general specification allows for a systematic reaction of the policy instrument to fluctuations in the relative price of the housing good.
Market clearing
Equilibrium in the non-residential and housing goods market requires the allocation of total production of the final good to total households' expenditure:
and:
Equilibrium in the debt market requires:
8 See Aspachs-Bracons and Rabanal (2011) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) .
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Calibration
The savers' discount rate is set to 0.99, implying a steady-state interest rate of 4%; the borrowers' discount rate is equal to 0.96. We assume log utility for both type of agents by setting σ = 1, as in Monacelli (2009 down-payment ratio, χ, is set to 0.2, implying a loan-to-value ratio of 80%, in line with the average for the U.S. and the euro area. 9 Elasticities of substitution across varieties in the goods markets are set to 4.33, in order to obtain a gross markup of 1.3. About nominal rigidities, we set the Calvo parameter θ C = 0.75 , corresponding to an average duration of price contracts of four quarters. We assume perfectly flexible prices in the residential sector, as mentioned above.
As to the sources of exogenous variations, we focus only on those that are peculiar to our setup, viz. housing demand and loan-to-value ratio shocks, which have been found to be the main source of fluctuation in house prices. Specifically, estimated DSGE models with housing and financial frictions (see Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) ) show that housing demand shocks drive most of the cyclical fluctuations in house prices. Ludvigson, Nieuwerburgh, and Favilukis (2013) argue that shocks to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), which can be interpreted as changes in financial regulation, are also important for generating fluctuations in house prices. Moreover, as illustrated in Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013) , credit constraints can amplify and propagate exogenous shocks only when such shocks generate fluctuations in the collateral value. This is clearly the case for housing demand and LTV shocks, but not, for instance, with TFP shocks. We therefore exclude the latter from our experiments. We also do not consider cost-push shocks either. The latter are known to be a source of policy tradeoff in a standard New Keynesian model. Such tradeoff is however distinct and independent from housing dynamics and financial frictions. We set the persistence parameters of the exogenous shocks to 0.95, close to the estimated values reported in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Darracq Pariès and Notarpietro (2008) . The standard deviation of housing demand and financial shocks are chosen to obtain a 1% increase on impact in house prices and the loan-to-value ratio, respectively, under a standard calibration of the monetary policy rule.
Welfare evaluation
In our normative analysis we look for the optimal monetary policy within the class of simple and operational interest rate rules, according to the definition of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007).
Namely, we restrict our attention to policy rules that (i) respond to variables that can be easily observed and (ii) deliver equilibrium determinacy. For the sake of simplicity, we do not include a measure of the output gap in the monetary policy rule. Apart from operational difficulties in estimating such measure in real time, it would be particularly troublesome to define an efficient level of output in our setup, which is characterized by monopolistic competition and financial frictions. Rather, we focus on real GDP growth as a measure of real activity. To fulfil the requirement that rules be operational, we discard all combinations of parameters that give rise to indeterminacy.
The individual and social welfare measures
In order to assess the relative performance of alternative monetary policy rules, we follow a common practice in the literature and compute a second-order approximation to the model solution. 10 We compare the welfare levels achieved under alternative monetary policy rules by assuming that the initial state of the system coincides with the deterministic steady state. 11 The performance of each simple rule is evaluated in terms of both individual and social welfare, to take into account households' heterogeneity. The welfare measure is computed by augmenting the model structure with equations (1) and (5) , which in recursive form read:
Because of agents' heterogeneity, individual welfare functions must be aggregated into a social welfare function. We follow Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013), Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) and Rubio (2011) and define the social welfare function as a weighted average of individual welfare as follows:
, so that given a constant stream of final consumption X, the two agents receive the same level of utility. In the following we focus on the simple rule that achieves the highest social welfare, but we also analyze the properties of rules that independently maximize borrowers' and savers' individual welfare.
The individual and social welfare levels achieved under each alternative rule provide an ordinal measure, which is sufficient for our purpose of selecting the optimal simple rule. However, in order to provide a quantitative characterization of the losses (or gains) entailed by each rule with respect to a benchmark policy, we also compute a consumption-equivalent measure, defined as the percentage change in final consumption that is required to make individual welfare under each rule equal to the individual welfare level achieved under the Ramsey optimal monetary policy (to be discussed below). Formally, let the welfare of each agent j = b, s under the Ramsey allocation be defined as follows:
Analogously, under any alternative regime a, we have: 
The Ramsey optimal monetary policy
Before illustrating the properties of the optimal simple monetary policy rule in our model, we briefly discuss the Ramsey optimal monetary policy. Let us consider the problem of a social planner that maximizes a social welfare function (defined above) under the private-sector optimality conditions that characterize the (imperfectly) competitive equilibrium. 12 The Ramsey planner chooses state-contingent allocations and prices to maximize (13) taking the equilibrium conditions (except the monetary policy rule) as given. We compute a second-order approximation to the solution of the Ramsey problem. 13 A few observations are in order. First, we assume that the Ramsey planner does not have access to subsidies and transfers to undo the distortions due to monopolistic competition and financial frictions. Therefore, the social planner cannot achieve the first-best equilibrium allocation. Moreover, the deterministic steady state under the Ramsey optimal plan is distorted and coincides with the decentralized equilibrium in the absence of exogenous shocks. Second, as already pointed out, a criterion must be chosen to aggregate individual utilities into a social welfare function, due to agents' discount factors heterogeneity. The aggregation scheme illustrated in the previous section guarantees that agents receive the same level of utility, for a given a stream of final consumption. We use (13) as our social welfare function also in the Ramsey problem. 14 However, as noted also in Mendicino and Pescatori (2008) , the Ramsey optimal policy is not suited for an analysis of the effects of alternative monetary policy regimes on the welfare of borrowers and savers separately. Therefore, when computing individual welfare in terms of consumption equivalent units, we aim at providing a complementary quantitative indicator of the size of the losses achieved by each agent under alternative monetary policy regimes. It is understood that the Ramsey problem only maximizes aggregate welfare. Third, the solution to the Ramsey problem crucially depends on the definition of the social planner's intertemporal discount factor in equation (13). In particular, while the period social welfare function W t reflects the differences in the individual discount factors, computing the Ramsey planner's optimality conditions requires an appropriate definition of the planner's discount factor. In the following we assume that the social planner discounts future utility with the saver's intertemporal discount factor β s . This assumption is motivated by the observation that in the deterministic steady state of the decentralized economy (which coincides with the Ramsey deterministic steady state) it is the saver's discount factor β s that determines the nominal interest rate. As such, it would be inappropriate to use the borrower's discount factor to discount social welfare.
Welfare maximizing rules
In order to compute the welfare-maximizing monetary policy rule, a search is performed in the The first row reports the parameters of the optimal rule and the corresponding social and individual welfare levels, with the corresponding welfare losses (relative to the Ramsey optimal monetary policy) in parenthesis. The second and third row report the rules that directly maximize the saver's and borrower's individual welfare, respectively.
The optimal simple rule features a relatively high degree of inertia (0.9) and no response to GDP variations. The latter result is in line with the findings of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) in a standard New Keynesian model without financial frictions. The presence of a collateral constraint thus does not result in a prominent role being played by the direct stabilization of real activity. The response to consumer price inflation is large, although well below the upper bound.
Such result is consistent with previous contributions that have analyzed the optimal response to inflation in DSGE models with credit constraints and housing. Lambertini, Mendicino, and
Punzi (2013) find that, under news shocks, complete inflation stabilization is suboptimal in the presence of agents' heterogeneity, a feature shared by our model. The suboptimality of full inflation stabilization in our setup has to do with the implied unintended transfers of wealth between borrowers and savers. As debt contracts are fixed in nominal terms, any increase in the inflation rate reduces the real value of existing debt and induces a fall in the real interest rate, ceteris paribus (the opposite holds true in the presence of a negative inflation shock). Such effect reflects the well-known debt-deflation mechanism. 16 As a result, an unexpected rise in the inflation rate is equivalent to a transfer of wealth from the saver to the borrower (and viceversa in the case of an unexpected fall in inflation). The optimal rule takes into account such mechanism and avoids a complete neutralization of inflation volatility. Finally and most importantly, under the baseline calibration, the optimal simple rule features a negative response to house price fluctuations (-0.7), implying that the nominal interest rate should fall in response to a rise in house prices.
Looking at the second and third row of Table 1 helps clarifying the results.
On the one hand, the best rule from the saver's viewpoint (second row) resembles an inflation targeting regime. While the smoothing coefficient has a value of 0.5, the response to inflation 16 See Fisher (1933) .
takes the largest possible value in the range. 17 Conversely, the response to house price fluctuations is very small, although in the positive range. Hence, from the saver's perspective the presence of financial frictions slightly alters the prescriptions of optimal monetary policy in a multi-sector economy with different degrees of nominal price rigidity. The optimal rule should counteract movements in non-durable price inflation by sufficiently raising the nominal interest rate. However, the absence of nominal rigidities in the housing sector does not imply that fluctuations in house prices be completely neglected. The optimal coefficient attached to house price fluctuations is in fact positive, suggesting that the central bank should mildly contrast movements in house prices related to either a change in the demand for housing or a relaxation/tightening of borrowing limits. In both cases, in fact, the financial accelerator mechanism generated by the collateral constraint entails an increase in volatility of real variables, which is disliked by risk-averse consumers. As shown in Table 2 , the saver's preferred rule almost perfectly stabilizes the volatility of inflation and, as a result, the real interest rate.
The rule that maximizes the borrower's welfare is very different (see Table 1 , third row). The smoothing parameter is high (0.9), while the response to inflation is positive, although well below the upper bound. This reflects the above-mentioned benign effect of a positive inflation rate on the borrower's welfare. Most importantly, the optimal response to house price fluctuations from the borrower's viewpoint is negative, requiring a fall in the nominal interest rate in response to an exogenous increase in house prices. Through this reduction, the central bank can alleviate the distortion related to credit frictions, i.e. the existence of a borrowing limit. Consider a positive housing demand shock. By definition, the shock raises the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between housing and non-durable consumption. Each agent thus would like to consume more housing services. In the case of the borrowers, however, the perpetually binding collateral constraints limits their ability to consume as much housing as desired. In fact, from the borrower's first order optimality condition we have:
where ψ t is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the collateral constraint. The equation implies that the borrowers equate the marginal rate of substitution between housing and non-durable consumption to the user cost of durables. The latter depends on three components: the house price, the expected future utility derived from re-selling a housing unit in the future and a term that reflects the marginal utility of relaxing the borrowing constraint. The latter is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier associated to the collateral constraint. Importantly, since the constraint is assumed to bind at all times, the borrowers always need to buy one additional unit of housing (collateral) to obtain one additional unit of debt. A positive housing demand shock increases the MRS and therefore requires that the right-hand-side of equation (14) adjusts accordingly. If the central bank aims at maximizing borrowers' utility using the interest rate as an instrument, the best response is a decrease in the policy rate. In this way, in fact, the collateral constraint is relaxed, which is reflected in a rise in the third component of the user cost. In other words, the central bank allows the borrowers to expand their consumption of housing more than they would with a constant monetary policy rate. As such, borrowers' utility is maximized.
Consider now a negative housing demand shock, which decreases the MRS between housing and non-durable consumption. The marginal utility of an extra unit of housing falls. Consequently, the borrowers would like to reduce housing services. However, the assumption of a perpetually binding collateral constraint limits their ability to do so, since the borrowers' demand for housing must exactly match the available amount of debt, for given LTV ratio, nominal interest rate and inflation rate. In other words, absent a monetary policy intervention, the borrowers would not be able to reduce housing services as much as desired. Then, a central bank that directly maximizes the borrowers' utility would increase the nominal interest rate, in order to tighten the collateral constraint. By doing so, it implicitly reduces the optimal amount of housing that the borrowers must demand for the constraint to bind. As a result, it allows the borrowers to cut on housing consumption, increasing their utility. A similar line of argument holds in the case of LTV ratio shocks. All in all, the best policy response from the borrower's viewpoint maximizes borrower's welfare by counteracting the presence of financial market imperfections. Notably, the implied volatilities of inflation and the real interest rate are larger compared to those generated under the saver's preferred rule (see Table 2 ).
The social-welfare maximizing rule thus results from "compromising" between the markedly different welfare maximizing rules for borrowers and savers. First, the response to inflation is not as aggressive as it would be in a frictionless model. Inflation is not fully stabilized under the optimal rule (see Table 2 ), reflecting the existence of a transfer of wealth between borrowers and savers resulting from unexpected variations in the inflation rate. Second, it features a non-zero response to house prices, again departing from the optimal monetary policy prescriptions in a model with perfect credit markets. Figures 1-3 show the social and individual welfare surfaces around the optimal rule. 18 The social welfare function displays a marked concavity around the optimized coefficients. In particular, a smaller response to inflation would imply extremely large losses from a social perspective.
As shown in Figure 2 , the saver's welfare is relatively flat when π is sufficiently large, and declines when π is small. To the opposite, the borrower's welfare surface is monotonically decreasing in φ π , reflecting the preference for less inflation stabilization, and increasing in φ πH (see Figure 3) .
Interestingly, the socially optimal rule does not imply a Pareto improvement with respect to the Ramsey policy. In fact, while the borrower is better off under the simple rule, the saver is worse off. A few observations are in order. First, the socially optimal rule implies an individual gain for the borrower, compared to the Ramsey allocation. The fact that a simple rule can attain a larger individual welfare level than the Ramsey optimal policy should not be regarded as surprising. As already noted, the social planner discounts future utility is assumed to be discounted by the social planner with the saver's intertemporal discount factor β s , which is likely to distort the borrowers' consumption plans if compared to a competitive equilibrium. Second, it is interesting to note that only in one case it is possible to obtain a Pareto improvement compared to the Ramsey allocation, namely under the saver's preferred rule, which closely approximates an inflation targeting regime.
Impulse response functions
In order to highlight the main features of the transmission mechanism, this section illustrates the dynamic responses of the model economy to the two shocks. Figures 4 and 5 report the impulse responses of the main variables after a housing demand shock and a financial shock, respectively. Each panel reports the responses under the optimal rule (solid black line), the saver's and borrower's preferred rule (dotted blue and dashed red lines, respectively) and the Ramsey optimal policy (solid light blue line with diamonds).
Housing demand shock
Since the optimal simple rule features a negative response to house prices, the initial increase in housing demand drives house prices up without prompting a counteracting response by the central bank. In fact, the nominal interest rate initially falls and, due to the high inertia, remains below its baseline value for a significant amount of time. The dynamics of the main real variables follows from the differences in individual responses of the two types of agents. The positive valuation effect on existing collateral of higher house prices represents a positive income shock for the borrowers, who, being impatient, use all of the extra-amount of income to finance current consumption of both goods. Indeed, as Figure 4 shows, the borrowers increase both non-durable consumption and housing, under each of the three simple rules. Private debt also increases (not reported), reflecting the more favourable borrowing conditions. To the opposite, the initial increase in house prices generated by the positive demand shock only represents a relative price increase for the savers, whose response is thus a substitution away from the more expensive housing good to non-durable consumption. In fact, the savers' consumption of both goods falls, reflecting the complementarity of non-durables and housing in final consumption. As a result, the inflation rate falls, driving the nominal and real interest rate down. GDP gradually falls and remains below its steady-state value for a prolonged period of time. Interestingly, under the saver's preferred rule (which approximates an inflation targeting regime), the initial increase in house prices is partly counteracted by the (small) increase in the policy rate, which in turn raises the real interest rate too, depressing saver's consumption of both goods. Nevertheless, the expansion in borrowing capacity brought about by the initial increase in house prices is sufficient to sustain an increase in the borrower's consumption of both goods. Finally, under the Ramsey optimal monetary policy the initial increase in the policy rate is larger compared to all the simple rules, inducing a much larger initial fall in GDP. Importantly, under the Ramsey-optimal policy, the inflation rate is not completely stabilized. The presence of a financial imperfection (the collateral constraint) alters the traditional optimal monetary policy prescription and makes 23 pure inflation targeting a suboptimal strategy. Previous contributions in the literature 19 have highlighted that in the presence of collateral constraints the monetary policymaker faces a tradeoff between stabilizing inflation (which would make the savers better off) and relaxing the collateral constraint, by tolerating a higher initial increase in house prices and consequently a higher inflation rate (which would make the borrower better off). The extent to which the policymaker relaxes the borrowing constraint can be measured by the dynamics of the Lagrange multiplier associated to the collateral constraint (3). 20 Under all policy regimes, including the Ramsey policy, the multiplier falls below its baseline value, testifying a relaxation of the constraint, which makes the borrower better off. Clearly, the largest drop is observed under the policy rule that directly maximizes borrower's welfare.
Financial shock
The qualitative behaviour of the main macroeconomic variables is similar to the one observed after a housing demand shock. The larger loan-to-value ratio allows the borrower to obtain more funds, everything else equal, so that its consumption of both goods increases, financed with the extra amount of borrowing. Both the nominal and the real interest rate barely move in response to the shock. As a result, GDP is virtually unaffected, also reflecting the muted response of the saver's consumption. As a result, the amplification and propagation effect that it generates is smaller, too. The dynamics under the three simple rules are overall very similar and hardly distinguishable.
The role of financial frictions
This section discusses in detail the role of financial frictions, as captured by two model parameters: the share of borrowers, ω, and the loan-to-value ratio, (1 − χ). Under the baseline calibration, we have shown that the social-welfare maximizing monetary policy rule inherits the borrower's preference for a fall in the nominal interest rate in response to an appreciation in
19 See e.g. Monacelli (2009) 20 In the deterministic steady state the collateral constaint binds and, consequently, the Lagrange multiplier has a positive value (see e.g. Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) ). As noted in Monacelli (2009), even though the constraint holds with equality in a neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state, variations in its tightness are still measurable in terms of the corresponding shadow value, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier.
house prices due to higher demand, or to a loosening of credit standards. As a result, the optimal coefficient φ πH assumes negative values, if allowed to do so.
We start our analysis of the role of financial frictions by comparing the behaviour of the economy to the one observed in the absence of financial imperfections. More precisely, suppose that the economy is populated by a representative agent (the saver) so that there is no private borrowing and, accordingly, there are no borrowing limits. In this case, optimal monetary policy theory would prescribe to focus on non-durable price inflation -which is affected by the presence of nominal rigidities and the inherent inefficiency stemming from price dispersion -and ignore house price fluctuations.
21 In other words, inflation targeting would approximate the optimal policy. Results reported in Table 3 confirm such guess. Importantly and different from the case of a borrower/saver economy, the optimal inflation volatility is zero (not reported).
Having established that the presence of financial frictions does alter the optimal choice of an with a larger LTV ratio will provide the borrowers with more funds in response to the same shock, thus generating more volatile responses in real variables. As a result, the socially optimal rule must take into account not only the potential benefit for the borrower of a relaxation of the collateral constraint (generated via a negative response to house price fluctuations) but also the potential loss for the saver stemming from higher volatility. The latter component tends to prevail as the leverage increases. Therefore, for a given proportion of borrowers in the economy, the optimal rule features an optimal response to house prices which is increasing in the LTV
ratio.
An interesting implication of our results concerns the ability of the central bank to correctly identify and estimate the degree of financial frictions in the economy. Suppose the policymaker acts as if the correct description of the economy was the one delivered by our baseline calibration and implements the corresponding optimal simple rule, which features, among other things, a negative reaction to house price movements. If the true degree of financial frictions in the economy turns out to be larger, it is likely that the optimal response to house prices becomes positive. Clearly, the enacted monetary policy rule would be suboptimal in this case, generating unintended losses. Therefore, in our setup the estimation of the ("true") degree of financial frictions is thus crucial for the robustness, or lack thereof, of monetary policy rules. The analysis of such issue is beyond the scope of this paper and is left to future research.
Sensitivity analysis
This section provides two sensitivity analyses: first, we assess if and how the features of welfaremaximizing simple rules change under alternative assumptions on the degree of nominal price rigidity in the housing sector; second, considering the stochastic structure of the model, we modify the persistence of the housing demand shock.
Sticky house prices
The assumption of sticky house prices is used in Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) to overcome the so-called "comovement" problem, i.e. the fact that a monetary contraction leads to an expansion in residential investment in models with collateral constraints, a fact at odds with the data (see Monacelli (2009) ). The assumption can be rationalized on the basis of existing empirical evidence: e.g., Case (2008) documents that house prices are subject to inertia and are sticky downward. We test the robustness of our optimal simple rule under the assumption that the Calvo parameter governing the frequency of price adjustments in the housing sector (θ H ) takes the following values: 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9, corresponding to an average duration of a price of, respectively, 1, 2, 4 and 10 quarters. Table 4 reports the results. The optimal simple rule consistently features a negative response to house prices, irrespective of the degree of nominal price rigidity. This reflects the preferences of the borrowers, who always prefer the largest possible reaction. Notably, in the savers' preferred rule the response to inflation and house prices are monotonically decreasing and increasing, respectively, in the degree of house price stickiness. Such pattern reflects the traditional optimal monetary policy prescription in a two-sector model with perfect financial markets, according to which the relative weight assigned to each sectoral inflation index is increasing in the degree of price rigidity (and in the weight of the corresponding good in the final consumption basket). Table 5 reports the results of the optimization exercise for a lower degree of persistence of the housing demand shock (ρ H = 0.5), which is the main driver of cyclical fluctuations in house prices in our setup. It is quite natural to conjecture that the persistence of this shock may have an impact on the dynamics of house prices and real variables in general. A more persistent shock implies in fact a higher predictability of future house prices, under the assumption of a stationary AR(1) process for the shock. In a recent contribution, Xiao (2013) uses the model of
Persistence of housing demand shocks
Iacoviello (2005) and shows that responding to house prices, in addition to output and inflation, helps stabilizing the economy (namely, it expands the determinacy region of the model) only if both private agents and the central bank do not possess current data on inflation and output and must forecast them, but do observe current housing prices. We explore the effects of changing the persistence of the housing demand shock, which, according to the stochastic structure of the model, should directly influence the forecastability of future house prices. As reported in the last column of Table 5 , the optimal response to house prices is virtually unaffected by the assumption 27 of a much lower persistence of the housing demand shock.
Conclusions
We develop a New Keynesian model with a housing sector and financial frictions on the household side, to analyse the scope for including house prices in the set of variables that the monetary policymaker targets and/or reacts to. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. The social welfare maximizing monetary policy rule may feature a reaction to house price variations, when the latter are generated by housing demand or financial shocks. The sign and size of the reaction crucially depend on the degree of financial frictions in the economy. When the share of constrained agents is relatively small, the optimal reaction is negative, implying that the central bank must move the policy rate in the opposite direction with respect to house prices. Moreover, the response to inflation is not as aggressive as it would be in a frictionless model, so that inflation is not fully stabilized under the optimal rule. However, when the economy is characterized by a sufficiently high average loan-to-value ratio, then it becomes optimal to counter house price increases by raising the policy rate.
Our results suggest that modelling financial imperfections, possibly also on the firms' side, seems of crucial relevance for the evaluation of monetary policy rules. Also, the implications for the construction of robust monetary policy rules -those whose performance is less severely affected by incorrect measurement of financial imperfections -seems worth probing. We leave these investigations to future research. 
